Showing posts with label Serie A. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Serie A. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Udinese Selling Their Way To The Top


Following back-to-back victories against Lazio and Chievo Verona, Udinese stand on the brink of achieving the improbable dream of qualifying for the Champions League for only the second time in their history. They only need one more point to guarantee their entrance through the “gates of paradise”, as Europe’s flagship competition was described by their down-to-earth coach Francesco Guidolin, but the last game of the season is against this year’s champions Milan, so this objective is still far from a fait accompli.

For a self-professed small club from the provinces, this would be a notable feat, especially as they only finished in 15th place last season and started this year’s campaign with four consecutive defeats, languishing in last place after six games. Before the season kicked-off, most pundits had predicted mid-table as the height of their aspirations, but Udinese’s free-flowing brand of attacking football (only Inter have scored more goals so far this season) has brought them many new admirers, as well as the record number of points in Serie A for Le Zebrette (little zebras).

Indeed, the venerated owner Giampaolo Pozzo proudly stated, “We play the best football in Italy”, a claim that was difficult to argue with after a series of scintillating performances, including an astonishing 7-0 win against Palermo (in Sicily), a thrilling 4-4 away draw against Milan and a richly deserved 3-1 victory against Inter. This is all the more impressive as Udinese are a young team of many nationalities with players emanating from all over the globe.

"Cristian Zapata - Colombia's finest"

Thus, the team that overcame Chievo featured four South Americans, most obviously the brilliant Chilean Alexis Sánchez, but also the pacy wing-backs, Mauricio Isla (also from Chile) and the Colombian Pablo Armero, plus the formidable centre-half Cristián Zapata (also from Colombia).

It also included two players from the African continent: midfielder Kwadwo Asamoah, who played every match for Ghana in the 2010 World Cup, and the Moroccan international Mehdi Benatia. Finally, the team contained three Europeans from smaller nations: the new Swiss captain, hard-working midfielder, Gökhan Inler, and his compatriot Almen Abdi, plus the coveted Slovenian goalkeeper, Samir Handanovič, who recently tied the league record of saving six penalties during the course of one season.

However, the bandiera of the team is the captain Antonio “Totò” Di Natale, who has been at the club since 2004, resisting all overtures to move away, including an offer last summer from Juventus. He was the top scorer in Serie A last season with an incredible 29 goals, an exploit that he is almost certain to repeat this season, as he is currently leading the capocannoniere charts with 28 goals.

"Toto Di Natale - not just for Christmas"

However, Pozzo has also paid tribute to the efforts of Guidolin, “Praise should be divided between him and the team. If you don’t have a great coach, nothing will be achieved.” After working minor miracles last year when he guided Parma to an unexpected 8th place in their first season back in the top flight, Guidolin somewhat surprisingly returned to Udinese for his second spell after a brief period in charge in 1998/99. As befitting the Friuli area, which is famous for its hard-working ethic (as epitomised by Fabio Capello), Guidolin’s motto for the team has been “humble but ambitious.” Nevertheless, after a distinctly unpromising start, Guidolin proved himself capable of making big decisions, when he “took a gamble” by moving the mercurial Sánchez from the wing to the middle, playing just behind Di Natale, which has turned out to be a masterstroke.

Despite being one of the oldest football clubs in Italy Udinese have never really won anything of note, though they do seem to have firmly established themselves in the top tier, having competed in Serie A for sixteen consecutive seasons, a record only matched by Milan, Inter, Lazio and Roma.

Furthermore, they have qualified for Europe eight times in the last 15 years, the highlight being when Luciano Spalletti’s team, built around the goals of Vincenzo Iaquinta and that man Di Natale, reached the Champions League in 2005, when they were eliminated at the group stages by a late goal from Barcelona. They also had a good run in the late 90s, when they qualified for the UEFA Cup four years in a row, initially under Alberto Zaccheroni, whose team was inspired by the prolific German striker Oliver Bierhoff. Most recently, Udinese got as far as the UEFA Cup quarter-finals in 2008/09 before being knocked-out by Werder Bremen.

"Giampaolo Pozzo - 25 years and counting"

The main man behind Udinese’s rise during this period has been the owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, an Italian businessman who bought the club at a difficult moment in 1986, when it was embroiled in a betting scandal, resulting in a nine-point penalty that meant relegation to Serie B.

History repeated itself in 1990, when the authorities imposed a four-point penalty after they deemed a phone call to Pozzo’s counterpart at Lazio on the eve of an important match as evidence of untoward activities. Since that time, Pozzo has relinquished his role as club president, leaving the day-to-day running to Franco Soldati and his son Gino, who has proved a veritable figlio d’arte (as the Italians say), following in his father’s footsteps to perfection. However, Giampaolo still very much remains the power behind the throne.

In the 90s Pozzo implemented a strategy that has become the envy of other clubs. Udinese have become famous for their skilled operations in the transfer market, especially their ability to find hidden talents all over the world, which they develop and later sell for large gains. The reputable Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore approvingly described this business model as running “like a Swiss watch.”

In reality, Udinese have been forced to be innovative, as their budget is much lower than the leading Italian clubs. It is fair to say that Serie A is not easy for provincial clubs, as the likes of Milan, Inter, Juventus and Roma have traditionally benefited from substantial financing by industrialist owners and superior television and commercial deals. It is also difficult for the smaller clubs to attract Italian talent into their primavera, hence Udinese’s decision to cast their net further afield.

"Samir Handanovic - loves a penalty save"

The club set up a global scouting network of around 50 observers with hundreds more local contacts in order to identify the most promising young players before they had become fully established and attracted the attention of the larger clubs. Furthermore, they have focused on “alternative” markets in Africa and South America that are relatively unexploited in order to purchase youngsters at a reasonable price. They usually buy from second tier countries, examples being Chile and Colombia in South America (as opposed to Brazil and Argentina) and Switzerland and Slovenia in Europe.

This arrangement also works well for the players, who accept low salaries in return for further development, experience in one of Europe’s best leagues and the opportunity to put themselves in the shop window. Although Udinese’s policy of acting as a stepping stone for their best players may not make their fans happy, there’s no doubt that the profits from the regular sales makes a huge contribution to the club’s financial self-sufficiency.

The sensational Alexis Sánchez is a great example of how carefully Udinese nurture their talent. Although the club bought him as a precocious 16-year old talent in 2006, he did not arrive at Udinese until the summer of 2008, having been loaned out twice as part of the development process: initially to the Chilean club Colo Colo, then to River Plate in Argentina to give him experience abroad, but not too far from home.

"Guidolin - where did it all go right?"

Udinese have bolstered their strategy by forming a partnership with Granada, a club playing in the Spanish second division, where they loan youngsters that need playing time, such as the Ghanaian Jonathan Mensah. Given the Friuli club’s connections with the South American market, it is no coincidence that they opted for a club in a Spanish speaking country to park their players. In total, Granada currently have an amazing 14 players on loan from Udinese.

In fact, one of the logical results of Udinese’s approach is that they end up having an extremely large squad, so they absolutely need to loan out a vast number of players every season (earning them €3.6 million in 2010). Including the players at Granada, I make the current total 63, though I may well have lost count. This is the sort of “wheeler dealing” that makes Harry Redknapp look like a rank amateur.

The problem with all these ins and outs is that it makes it difficult for Udinese to progress to the next level, but their consistent presence in Serie A’s top ten over the years is ample proof of their ability to remain competitive despite the constant departures. It is strange to say, but they have effectively sold their way to the top without weakening their squad, as seen by this small club providing no fewer than eight players at last year’s World Cup: Di Natale, Sánchez, Isla, Asamoah, Inler, Handanovič, the Italian Simone Pepe (since loaned to Juventus) and the Serb Aleksandar Luković (since sold to Zenit St. Petersburg).

Of course, like every other club, Udinese’s record in the transfer market is not perfect and they have bought their fair share of duds (also suffering from a fake passport scandal in 2000), but overall their policy has been a solid money-maker. The scouting network reportedly costs €4 million a year, but this investment has produced some staggering financial results.

In the last decade, Udinese have received over €206 million from sales in the transfer market. Deducting purchases of €94 million during the same period gives net proceeds of an astonishing €112 million. In most years since 2005, there have been at least a couple of big money sales, including the likes of David Pizzarro (Inter), Marek Jankulovski (Milan), Per Krøldrup (Everton), Vincenzo Iaquinta (Juventus), Sulley Muntari (Portsmouth), Andrea Dossena (Liverpool), Asamoah Gyan (Rennes), Fabio Quagliarella (Napoli), and last summer, Gaetano D’Agostino and Felipe (both to Fiorentina). It’s a seemingly endless production line of players who were bought cheaply, but sold on for large sums.

Even as the transfer market stagnates elsewhere, Udinese have somehow managed to keep ahead of the others. Last year, their net sales were higher than any other club in Serie A, while the previous season they were only surpassed by Milan, thanks to the truly exceptional sale of Kaká to Real Madrid.

Over the last four years, their net proceeds of almost €60 million have been far ahead of other Italian clubs. In fact, only five other clubs had a net surplus in that period. To place Udinese’s performance into context, their net gains are higher than those other five clubs put together – that’s extraordinary.

And it’s not just the players who appreciate Udinese’s ability to develop individuals. Friuli has also proved to be an ideal environment for ambitious coaches with the two most eminent graduates in recent times being Luciano Spalletti, who has gone on to win the Russian League with Zenit St. Petersburg and the Coppa Italia with Roma, and Alberto Zaccheroni, who instantly delivered a scudetto to Milan.

The reason why Udinese are so concentrated on making money from player sales is immediately apparent when you look at how small their revenue is. Although it is the tenth highest in Italy at €41 million, leaving them in mid-table respectability (or mediocrity, depending which way you look at it) in the Serie A money league, it is streets behind the leading clubs. Last season, three clubs earned more than five times as much revenue: Inter €225 million, Milan €208 million and Juventus €205 million. Roma generate three times as much revenue at €123 million, while Fiorentina, Napoli and Lazio all have turnovers more than double that of Udinese.

This really puts Udinese’s performance this season into perspective, especially when you consider that a club with the same revenue, Sampdoria, has just been relegated. If they do manage to get into the Champions League, the gap to the leading European clubs becomes more like an abyss with clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona earning ten times as much income.

This highlights the challenge that would face Udinese in Europe. As an example, when Sampdoria crashed out to Werder Bremen in the final qualifying round for the group stages, they were facing a team whose annual budget is two and a half times as high as their own. Another interesting comparative is that Udinese’s 2009/10 revenue was lower than every single club in the Premier League, so less than the likes of Burnley, Hull City and Portsmouth, who were all relegated to England’s second tier.

Other points stand out from the analysis of the revenue mix. Udinese get a very small proportion (9%) of their revenue from gate receipts with only two clubs having a lower percentage (Siena and Juventus). On the other hand, Udinese’s reliance on TV income is very high at 64%, even without European revenue.

The importance of player trading to Udinese’s business can be seen very well in the above graph. If profit on player sales is considered as “revenue”, its contribution has been notable in the past few years, averaging 35-40% of normal turnover since 2008. Put another way, the club makes six times as much from the transfer market as gate receipts. In fact, it makes almost twice as much from player sales as gate receipts and commercial income combined. This would be very worrying if Udinese had not shown that they are more than capable of maintaining this “revenue stream” year after year.

Of course, Udinese are not unique in their ability to generate profits on player sales, but they compare favourably to other clubs who are equally renowned in this area. For example, in the last three years Udinese made €78 million, which may be less than the €91 million earned by Lyon and €111 million earned by Porto in the same period, but in fairness those clubs do have a far higher spending capacity.

In spite of their low turnover, Udinese have managed to operate a sustainable model with cumulative net profits of €3 million over the last six years. After two years of solid profits in 2008 (€7.9 million) and 2009 (€6.9 million), the club did report a small loss of €6.9 million last year. There were a number of reasons for this decline: lower gate receipts, as there was no European competition in 2009/10, €1.5 million; increase in staff costs to strengthen the squad and a payment following the departure of former coach, Pasquale Marino, €4 million; lower profit from player sales, €7 million; and a €4 million tax payment on prior years’ profits.

Essentially, the profit and loss account reiterates the importance of profit on player sales, which is used to more or less balance the books. Obviously, whether this is sufficient depends on how much money is made from player trading. Last year, profit from player sales of €23.6 million was not enough to offset the €26.1 million operating loss, but in 2009 the higher profits on player sales of €30.9 more than compensated for the operating loss of €17.4 million.

Eagle-eyed financial observers may have noticed that the revenue figures used in my money League are lower than those used in the club’s own books. The reason for the difference is that Italian accounts report gross revenue, while I have shown net income, as this is consistent with the approach used in other countries. Therefore, I have excluded the following: (a) gate receipts given to visiting clubs €0.6 million; (b) TV income given to visiting clubs €4.3 million; (c) revenue from player loans €3.6 million. Adding the €8.5 million adjustments to the €40.8 million in my analysis gives the €49.3 million reported in Italy.

If we look at how Udinese compare to other clubs in terms of profit, a few points emerge. First, they are indeed one of the more profitable clubs with only five ahead of them over the last two years – when their result was a perfect example of how to break-even with an aggregate profit of exactly zero. Second, the significance of profit on player sales is yet again emphasised with only two clubs recording higher profit on player sales as a percentage of turnover (Parma and Genoa). Third, just look at the size of the losses made in then last two years by Inter €223 million and Milan €77 million.

Note that the profit on player sales used by La Gazzetta dello Sport are higher than mine, as they have only shown plusvalenze, leaving minusvalenze in costs. Very technical, but rest assured that the source data is identical.

By now, it should be abundantly clear to everyone that Udinese’s business model is hugely reliant on profit made by selling players, but, whisper it quietly, the winds of change may just be blowing at Udinese. Last week, Giampaolo Pozzo spoke of three factors that might grow the club’s resources outside its traditional prowess in the transfer market, namely the Champions League, television money and a renovated stadium. If these plans come to fruition, Udinese may be able to modify its celebrated strategy and hang on to its stars.

"Mauricio Isla - Udinese's other Chilean"

Along with his son Gino, he understands that for Udinese to grow, the club’s approach needs to be fine-tuned with more emphasis on other revenue streams. That does not mean that Udinese will totally jettison their “buy low, sell high” strategy, not least because they’re so damn good at it, but it does suggest that they realise that they need to do more financially to advance to the next level. As the owner put it, “We are fighting with the dagger between our teeth for the last slice of the TV money. Then, there’s the plan to improve the stadium. And Europe brings higher earnings.” Obviously, this will not be easy, but let’s look at each of these potential growth areas in turn.

Reaching the Champions League would be the biggest game changer. Last time Udinese qualified in 2005/06, they received around €12 million revenue: €9 million from UEFA’s central distribution (participation fees, prize money and TV income) and €3 million additional gate receipts. However, the sums available these days are considerably higher with the four Italian qualifiers last season earning an average of €29 million (Inter €49 million, Milan €24 million, Fiorentina €22 million and Juventus €21 million).

It’s also worth noting that while the Europa League would help boost funds, it is nowhere near as rewarding as the Champions League with last season’s three Italian representatives (Roma, Lazio and Genoa) only earning around €2 million each. Indeed, the team that actually wins the Europa League, having played countless matches, only receives €6.4 million. Udinese are well aware of this fact, having earned just €1.2 million from their UEFA Cup adventure in 2008/09, and Pozzo has spoken of the “big difference” between the two competitions, so it is very worthwhile securing that fourth place.

"Celebrate the good times"

The importance of qualification to Udinese’s plans has been underlined by the owner’s recent announcements. First, he said, “With the Champions, I would like to keep Sánchez and the other family jewels” and then went a stage further, “If we get into the Champions, then I will buy.”

Of course, they’re not there yet and have two more hurdles to clear. First, they have to cement their position in Serie A, taking at least a point from Milan, but this would only qualify them for the Champions League play-off round and they could face a very tricky tie to reach the lucrative group stage. Just look how close Spurs came to disaster in their match against the Swiss minnows, Young Boys Bern, before finally squeaking through.

The other obvious point is that it will be really hard for Udinese to qualify for the Champions League on a regular basis, especially as Italy will lose one of their four places from 2011/12, now the Bundesliga has overtaken Serie A in UEFA’s table of coefficients. In such an eventuality, Udinese would have to cope with a dramatic reduction in funds, as happened to them in 2007, when their revenue fell by more than a third from €44 million to €28 million, turning a €6.5 million profit into a €6.3 million loss.

Udinese’s domestic TV deal was worth around €26 million last season, having risen in 2008 when the new contract was introduced, but this pales into insignificance compared to the €90-100 million that Juventus, Milan and Inter have been earning from their individual deals. These vast differences have meant that the playing field in Italy has been anything but level, but years of protest finally led to a new collective agreement being implemented at the beginning of this season. We know that the total money guaranteed by exclusive media rights partner Infront Sports will be approximately 20% higher than before at over €1 billion a year, but it is still unclear what the impact will be on each club’s revenue.

There is a complicated distribution formula, which will still favour the bigger clubs, though there is likely to be a reduction at the top end. Under the new regulations, 40% will be divided equally among the 20 Serie A clubs; 30% is based on past results (5% last season, 15% last 5 years, 10% from 1946 to the sixth season before last); and 30% is based on the population of the club’s city (5%) and the number of fans (25%).

The larger clubs will lose out from the new arrangement, but the mid-tier clubs like Udinese will benefit. There is still a question over how the number of fans (worth 25% of the deal) will be calculated, leading to a major dispute between the larger clubs (represented by Milan, Inter, Juventus, Roma and Napoli) and the smaller clubs (represented by Udinese, Parma, Sampdoria, Palermo and Catania), even over which market research companies to use. Pozzo is at the forefront of this battle, as he understands the importance of the decision to the revenue of clubs like his. Whatever the final ruling, it seems reasonably certain that Udinese’s TV revenue will grow – the only question is by how much.

However, Udinese’s real Achilles heel, like so many Italian clubs, is their paltry match day income. Last season’s gate receipts of €3.6 million were exactly the same as the amount Manchester United generate in a single match at Old Trafford. In fact, the so-called theatre of dreams took in €122 million of match day income last season, which is an incredible 34 times as much as Udinese.

That is partly explained by Udinese’s ongoing struggle to attract spectators. In fact, last season’s average attendance of 17,356 was only the 13th highest in Serie A. Given the relatively small size of Udine (population 175,000), that’s perhaps not overly surprising, but it’s hardly conducive to financial stability at a football club. This also underlines the club’s need to work the transfer market, as the profit from one good player sale (€8 million) is the equivalent of Udinese tripling their gate receipts.

Nevertheless, the club has announced plans to renovate the Stadio Friuli, though interestingly the work will actually reduce the stadium’s capacity from the current (restricted) 30,667 to a more realistic 22,000. Although one objective is to increase revenue, the underlying objective is to make the stadium a “theatre of football”, which will be more attractive to local fans and tempt the crowds back. Pozzo explained, “We don’t want a cathedral in the desert.”

"Design for life"

The initial plans were for a multi-purpose development, including restaurants, hotels, gyms and a commercial area, but this met with opposition from existing concerns. Instead, the local council has in principle approved a modern, two tier stadium with all seats fully covered and the athletics track eliminated, bringing the spectators closer to the pitch, the inspirations being the Stadio Luigi Ferraris in Genoa and the Stadio Dino Manuzzi in Cesena.

There will be more hospitality areas and the club will be allowed to stage a number of events, such as music concerts and rugby matches, which will generate additional revenue, but this is not likely to be significant in my opinion. There has been no mention to date of any naming rights.

Unlike Juventus, the “new” stadium will not belong to the club, but continue to be owned by the council. In return for Udinese paying all the construction costs, which are estimated to be around €25 million, the council will give the club a 65-year lease and reduce the annual rent, which is currently €200,000 a year. The other condition that Pozzo has imposed is that the building work must commence this summer, so that the new stadium is ready in time for the start of the 2013/14 season.

It had been hoped that the new stadium would be used for Euro 2016, but that tournament has now been awarded to France. UEFA’s minimum capacity for hosting such international events is 34,000, but the plans allow for the Stadio Friuli’s capacity to be increased at a later date by adding a third tier if necessary.

There is also room for growth in the club’s commercial revenue, which actually slightly decreased in 2010 to €11.1 million, one of the lowest in Serie A. The shirt sponsorship deal with Rumanian car manufacturer Dacia (owned by Renault) was extended two years in July 2009, but is only worth €1 million a season, a lot less than other Italian clubs: Milan – Emirates €12 million, Inter – Pirelli €9 million, Juventus – BetClic €8 million, Roma – Wind €7 million, Napoli – Acqua Lete €5.5 million and Fiorentina – Mazda €4 million.

Those clubs also receive higher sums from their kit suppliers than the €1.1 million Udinese get from Lotto Sports (Inter – Nike €18 million, Milan – Adidas €13 million, Juventus – Nike €12 million, Roma – Kappa €5 million and Napoli – Macron €4.7 million). However, one of the indirect benefits of qualifying for the Champions League is higher commercial income, as sponsors see greater exposure.

Given the low revenue, the club has admitted that it is under “continual pressure to contain costs”, which effectively means the wage bill. Udinese have done a reasonable job here with wages rising in line with revenue since 2005, both with growth around 55%. The problem is that as the turnover is so small, even a minor increase in the wages has an inordinate impact on the important wages to turnover ratio, e.g. a €4 million rise in 2010 caused this ratio to worsen from 58% to 71%.

Nevertheless, Udinese’s wage bill of €31 million is still one of the smallest in Serie A and looks utterly insignificant compared to those of the “big four”, who appear to be playing in a different league altogether: Inter €234 million, Milan €172 million, Juventus €138 million and Roma €101 million. This is a double-edged sword for the club: on the one hand, it’s financially prudent, but on the other hand it makes it difficult to hold on to players. Then again, given Udinese’s high reliance on profits from player sales, maybe this is not an issue.

Only one player at Udinese, Di Natale, receives more than €1 million annual salary with the next highest paid being Sánchez €0.7 million and Zapata €0.65 million. Totó’s value looks even better, if you consider that he has scored exactly twice as many goals this season as Zlatan Ibrahimović, who is on €9 million a year.

Bonus payments can also have an impact on successful clubs, but Udinese’s players have apparently only been promised €3 million in total if they remain in the top four, described as a “cherry on the cake.”

Player amortisation, the cost of writing down transfer fees over the length of a player’s contract, is not that high at €14 million, but this is material when your turnover is only €44 million. Indeed, the increase in 2007 was noted in the accounts as one of the reasons for that year’s loss.

Udinese’s net debt has been steadily increasing in the last four years and now stands at €36 million after deducting €1 million cash. This includes €13 million bank loans and €24 million from a factoring arrangement with Unicredit. Although the bank loans are clearly not excessive, it is worth noting that only three Italian clubs have higher balances: Milan €164 million, Inter €71 million and Juventus €33 million.

This is nothing to really worry about, especially as Udinese have net balances owed to them on transfer fees of €24 million, made up of €28 million owed to other clubs and a hefty €52 million owed by other clubs. Given the way that Italian clubs do business with many stage payments, this is by no means unusual, but the fact that the balances are so high is a direct result of Udinese’s buying and selling strategy. There shouldn’t be any major issues here, though the exception that proves the rule was the dispute with Portsmouth over money owed for Muntari.

In fact, Udinese has one of the strongest balance sheets in Serie A with net assets of €38 million, only behind Fiorentina and Juventus. This fine achievement is actually under-stated, as the players are only valued at €48 million in the accounts, while the respected Transfermarkt website has estimated that a more realistic market value would be in the order of €111 million. No wonder Pozzo allowed himself to proclaim, “Fortunately the club is in the best of (financial) health.”

So what of the future?

In the accounts, the club confidently expects a “positive result” for 2010/11, based on the new collective TV rights deal and (stop me if you’ve heard this one before) “notable” profits on player sales in the 2010 summer window – already higher than the total achieved in the whole of 2009/10.

"Gokhan Inler - Swiss efficiency"

Nevertheless, other clubs will inevitably still apply pressure on Udinese to sell their talented players this summer. There would be no shortage of suitors for Sánchez, including Barcelona and Manchester United, though Manchester City are understood to be in pole position with a reported bid of €35-40 million. In some ways, although no club would want to lose a player of his calibre, this would be the ultimate vindication of the Udinese strategy, as they only paid €3 million for the little maestro. Even Guidolin admitted, “He is destined to join a top club, considering the quality he has shown for some time.”

At least a deal of this magnitude would mean that Udinese would have no need to sell any of the other players, though Asamoah, Inler and Zapata are all in demand. For the moment, Pozzo is holding firm, “Our wish is to strengthen the squad, but it’s up to the players. However, this time nobody wants to leave.” Furthermore, the players’ values should go up if they perform well in the Champions league.

Those may be the words of an astute salesman, but, as we have seen, Udinese should soon have more money from other sources. Pozzo again: “I know we are regarded as a selling club, but now things have changed, as the money in Italy will no longer just go into the pockets of the usual 4-5 big clubs.”

"Happy days for Asamoah"

Longer-term the advent of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules should theoretically benefit well-run clubs like Udinese, but paradoxically it also poses two threats to their strategy. First, it could reduce the value of transfer fees, as clubs do not want to carry high amortisation costs – indeed, transfer spending was down almost 30% in Europe’s major leagues in 2010. Second, more clubs will try to emulate Udinese’s success at developing youth players, so the competition will become even more intense. This is why Udinese have started to invest in facilities to house teenagers, as they search for even younger players.

The chances are that Udinese will not completely abandon their successful buying and selling strategy, but changes to the TV rights in Italy, allied with their modernised stadium should add a few more strings to their bow. In the short-term, they can hope to further enhance their financial status by qualifying for the Champions League. What a present that would be for their respected owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, who celebrates his 70th birthday next week after 25 years at the club.


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Thursday, April 21, 2011

Napoli's Success Story


Despite a disappointing home defeat to Udinese last Sunday, this has still been a great season for Napoli, who currently lie second in the Serie A league table with five games remaining. Even though the scudetto is now probably beyond them, there’s still a slim chance that they could catch the leaders Milan, while qualification for the Champions League looks more than likely. The team has played its football at a fast tempo and with the intensity typical of manager Walter Mazzarri, a shrewd tactician and a powerful motivator, which has delighted the club’s passionate supporters.

The prolific Uruguayan striker Edinson Cavani has been the focal point of some exhilarating displays, scoring 25 goals already this season. His form has been so impressive that a newspaper from his homeland gushingly described him as Vesuvius, a comparison that club president Aurelio De Laurentiis smilingly corrected, “The volcano is dormant, while our striker is very much active.” Equally impressive in a fluid tridente have been the Slovak Marek Hamsik, a skilful midfielder, and the pacy Argentine schemer Ezequiel Lavezzi.

Of course, this is not the first time that South Americans have played a vital role for the Partenopei and this season’s title race with Milan is reminiscent of the glory days of the late 80s, when Napoli became the first mainland southern club to win the league in 1986/87, a triumph that they repeated three years later. At that time, they were inspired by the legendary Maradona, who formed a lethal partnership with Brazilian forward Careca. Ably supported by Italian internationals Ciro Ferrara, Salvatore Bagni and the aptly named Fernando De Napoli, that team also won the UEFA Cup in 1988/89, beating Stuttgart 5-4 over two legs in the final.

"Lavezzi shows some love"

Napoli’s modern day success has been matched by their achievements off the pitch, as they have reported profits four years in a row, a rare feat indeed for any football club. The press has elected the club “queen of the balance sheet” (the Italian word for club is feminine), while saying that its accounts are “Champions League standard”. Given how many clubs in Europe’s flagship competition make hefty losses, this is perhaps not the best analogy, but we understand what they mean and they’re right: Napoli’s progress in recent years has been remarkable and all the more impressive, as it has not been at the price of their finances.

Their accomplishments off the pitch have been maintained despite De Laurentiis funding significant investment in the squad since Napoli returned to Italy’s top tier in 2007 in an ambitious attempt to catch up with the leading clubs. In fact, according to respected website Transfermarkt, Napoli have spent more than any other Serie A club in the last four years with net spend of €118 million, just ahead of Juventus. The fact that they have still managed to balance their books (and more) in the face of such heavy spending is testament to their ability to keep a lid on the wage bill, while boosting revenue, most notably in the commercial arena.

This financial fortitude will come as a great relief to the club’s fans who had to endure so many trials and tribulations after the turn of the Millennium. Following the departure of extravagant longtime president Corrado Ferlaino in 1994, Napoli’s financial woes were laid bare, leading to a rapid fall from grace as a succession of different owners tried to stem the losses. This had an inevitable impact on the team’s performances, leading to relegation to Serie B in 1997/98. Although they managed to return to the top flight two years later, they were again relegated the following season. The endless legal battles among the owners took their toll, culminating in the club being declared bankrupt by a local tribunal in August 2004 with debts of €79 million.

The Italian football federation ruled that Napoli could only survive professionally if an owner started a new franchise for the club in Serie C1 (the third tier of Italian football), otherwise the club would have to compete in amateur competitions. Luciano Gaucci, the owner of Perugia, tried to put together a rescue plan, but lacked the resources to do so, leaving the way clear for Aurelio De Laurentiis to save the club by paying the courts €30 million, ensuring that professional football was kept alive in his home city.

"Meet El Presidente"

“DeLa” is a successful movie producer, nephew of the celebrated Dino De Laurentiis, but he was confronted by a desperate situation: no equipment, no training ground and crucially no players. Furthermore, the new club had not been allowed to retain the name SSC Napoli, so was given the (frankly awful) name of Napoli Soccer.

Nevertheless, where there’s a will, there’s a way and “DeLa” acted quickly to address the club’s urgent problems. He injected money, recruited Pierpaolo Marino from Udinese as sporting director and hired the hard-working Edy Reja as coach. It was the beginning of a new era.

Despite the chaotic circumstances at the start of the season, Napoli only just missed out on promotion from Serie C1 in 2004/05, losing to Avellino in the promotion play-off, but they absolutely stormed the league the following year, winning the title by 13 points. A second successive promotion followed the next season, when they went up from Serie B along with Juventus and Genoa.

They finished in a highly creditable eighth place in their first season back in Serie A, though De Laurentiis admitted that this was in no small part due to the Calciopoli match-fixing scandal that saw Juventus, Milan, Lazio, Fiorentina and Reggina punished. Having qualified for the 2008/09 UEFA Cup, albeit via the Intertoto Cup, and this season’s Europa League, following the more legitimate route of sixth place in Serie A, Napoli are well and truly back.

"Mazzarri encourages the troops"

When De Laurentiis took over the club, he put into place a project to return Napoli to Serie A in five years. As it turned out, they comfortably beat that target, so this can be described as a huge success. However, this did not stop the owner from replacing the popular Edy Reja with the former coach of the national team Roberto Donadoni in March 2009, after a worrying run of form.

This was a sign of things to come, as De Laurentiis embarked on a second cycle that summer, “Tonight starts my new five year era at the club. This is a key time for Napoli and we can’t afford any more errors.” First, he fired respected sporting director Marino, whose spectacular successes in the transfer market like Hamsik and Lavezzi were not enough to compensate for a series of poor purchases. In his place, the club brought in Riccardo Bigon, whose father Alberto Bigon was the coach who guided Napoli to their second scudetto.

Then, it was the turn of Donadoni to get the chop, after the president admitted he had made a mistake in dismissing Reja, with former Sampdoria coach Walter Mazzarri joining the new project. With typical understatement, De Laurentiis said that Mazzarri was “far better” than the then Inter manager Jose Mourinho, but it has to be remembered that he had also said Reja “must stay at Napoli for the rest of his life.”

That said, it would be a brave man that dared to carp at De Laurentiis’ deeds, as he has been an almost exemplary owner for Napoli, completely rebuilding the club in just a few years, so much so that they are one of only two teams in Serie A that made profits in each of the last two seasons (the other one is Catania), generating a total of €11 million. That’s some achievement, when you consider that the only team ahead of them in the league (Milan) lost a combined €77 million in the same period, while the team just behind them (Inter) made staggering losses of €223 million.

While it’s true that money does not always buy success, it sure helps, so for Napoli to be doing so well with such a low budget is praiseworthy indeed. Very few clubs manage to balance success on the pitch with solid financials, so Napoli deserve a big pat on the back, even more so given the challenges faced by Italian clubs, which have had to cope with falling crowds, accusations of corruption and occasional violence and racism, not to mention an over-reliance on television money.

However, Napoli have managed to buck the trend, making profits in each of the last four years. The last time that they made a loss was when they were in Serie C1 in 2005/06. This is even more impressive, when you consider that they have achieved this without the benefit of Champions League money and relatively low profits on player sales, e.g. €6.6 million in 2009/10 (Mannini to Sampdoria €4.9 million, Contini to Real Zaragoza €1.7 million) and €10 million the previous year. It is true that the continued investment in players reduced profit last season from €10.9 million to €0.3 million, as both wages and player amortisation significantly increased, but that’s still pretty good, considering that 16 of the 20 Serie A teams made losses in the same period.

Napoli’s revenue of €92 million is the sixth highest in Italy, on a similar level to Fiorentina and Lazio. However, it’s less than half the revenue generated by the traditional big four clubs, mainly due to their very high individual television deals. Milan lead the way with €225 million, followed by their local rivals Inter €208 million and Juventus €205 million. On the other hand, Napoli’s revenue is in turn more than twice as much as competitors like Genoa, Udinese and Sampdoria.

It also puts Napoli in 29th position in the Deloitte Money League, which ranks European clubs in order of revenue, a fall of one place over the previous season, just below clubs of the stature of Borussia Dortmund, Valencia, Benfica and Werder Bremen.

This is obviously fairly good by most standards, but the European league table also reveals the significant monetary advantage enjoyed by the leading teams with Real Madrid and Barcelona earning four to five times as much income as a club like Fiorentina. To place Napoli’s recent achievements into context, when they lost out to Liverpool in this season’s Europa League, they were facing a team whose annual budget is two and a half times as high as their own.

Two points stand out from the analysis of the revenue mix. Commercial revenue is relatively high, representing 41% of total revenue, which is one of the largest proportions of any Italian club, only surpassed by Siena (48%), but that is more due to the Tuscan club’s incredibly low match day revenue. In turn, this means that Napoli’s reliance on TV income is far lower than other clubs at just 43% of total revenue, which is the lowest in Serie A. As a comparison, the proportions at Juventus, Inter and Milan are considerably higher: 65%, 61% and 56% respectively.

Those of you who keep up with financial affairs may be wondering why the revenue figures used in my Money League are lower than those used in the analysis recently reported by La Gazzetta dello Sport. The reason for the difference is that Italian accounts report gross revenue, while Deloitte show the net income in their annual survey. In order to be consistent with other countries, I have adopted the Deloitte approach in my analysis, so have excluded the following: (a) gate receipts given to visiting clubs €2.7 million; (b) TV income given to visiting clubs €8.8 million; (c) revenue from player loans €1.2 million. Adding the €12.6 million adjustments to the €91.6 million in my analysis gives the €104.2 million reported in Italy.

Napoli’s revenue growth shows just how far they have come since the dark days of C1. In fact, their revenue is more than eight times higher with significant increases in all the revenue streams: match day €4 million to €14.5 million, commercial €5.1 million to €37.7 million and broadcasting €2 million to €39.4 million. The huge differences between each division can clearly be seen in the graph above, first in 2007 after the promotion to Serie B, then the following year with the elevation to Serie A.

The commercial income of €38 million is the most impressive aspect of this revenue growth, reflecting Napoli’s “modern and ambitious plan” to increase their “brand equity”. This is most obviously reflected in the enormous amount of branded merchandise that is available, which clearly demonstrates both the club’s future direction and the supporters’ appetite for all things Napoli.

According to Deloitte, Napoli’s commercial revenue is the 20th highest in Europe at about the same level as Roma, though it is still more than €20 million lower than Milan, who generate most commercial income in Italy, so there is still room for growth.

Napoli have a veritable raft of institutional sponsors, official partners and commercial partners, though their main official sponsor is Acqua Lete, who are paying €5.5 million for the current season. This is lower than Milan (Emirates €12 million), Inter (Pirelli €9 million) and Juventus (BetClic €8 million), but is higher than Roma (Wind €5 million) and Fiorentina (Mazda €4 million). There are rumours that De Laurentiis is looking for a new sponsor to pay €9 million a season, which is ambitious, but is a clear sign of intent (and would have the advantage of replacing the unpopular red Lete logo).

Kit supplier Macron replaced Diadora in 2009, signing a three-year deal worth around €4.7 million a season, which is a fair bit lower than the leading clubs: Milan – Adidas €13 million, Juventus – Nike €12 million, Inter – Nike €18 million. If the commercial aspirations are to be met, this is one area that will have to be tackled.

Despite the growth in commercial revenue, television remains the most important revenue stream, but only just, at €39 million, which is entirely derived from the domestic deal. The importance of Champions League TV revenue can be seen in the graph above, as it contributed an average of €29 million for the four Italian qualifiers (Inter €49 million, Milan €24 million, Fiorentina €22 million and Juventus €21 million). This explains virtually all of the difference in television revenue between Napoli and Fiorentina (€65 million).

To a lesser extent, this factor also explains most of the €3 million reduction in Napoli’s television revenue in 2009/10 from €42 million to €39 million, as the previous year included revenue from competing in the UEFA Cup.

The lack of a level playing field financially in Italy up to now has largely been due to the vast differences in the size of individual TV deals, where Juventus, Inter and Milan have been earning €90-100 million a season – more than twice as much as the likes of Napoli. After many years of protests at this inherent unfairness, this structure was replaced at the start of the current season with the move to a centralised collective deal. The total money guaranteed by exclusive media rights partner Infront Sports will be approximately 20% higher than before at over €1 billion a year, but it is still unclear what the impact will be on the revenue at individual clubs.

There is a complicated distribution formula, which will still favour the bigger clubs, though there is likely to be a reduction at the top end. Under the new regulations, 40% will be divided equally among the 20 Serie A clubs; 30% is based on number of fans (25%) and the population of the club’s city (5%); and 30% is based on past results (5% last season, 15% last 5 years, 10% from 1946 to the sixth season before last).

Of course, Napoli’s “ability to attract the paying public” (per the accounts) is also a key revenue driver. Although their match day revenue of €14.5 million (after deducting €2.7 million given to away clubs) is on the low side, this is not atypical for Italy. In fact, Napoli’s gate receipts are not very far behind Juventus €17 million and Roma €19 million, though Inter and Milan are much higher with €39 million and €31 million respectively.

The average attendance last season of 40,797 was the fourth highest in Italy, only behind Inter, Milan and Roma, and was actually the 30th highest in the whole of Europe, ahead of clubs like Sevilla, Tottenham Hotspur, Lyon and Porto. Signs of the fans’ loyalty abound, such as the 51,000 crowd that they attracted for their final game in Serie C1, which unsurprisingly is a record for that division. More recently, they took 15,000 fans with them when they played a match in Bologna, while their home average attendance this season has risen 9% to 44,509, including a 58,666 crowd for the match against Juventus.

Napoli play their home games at the imposing Stadio San Paolo, which has a capacity of 60,240 and is the third largest stadium in Italy after San Siro in Milan and Stadio Olimpico in Rome. As is the norm in Italy, the ground is not owned by the club, but by the local council, which is paid nearly €600,000 rent a year.

"The sound of the crowd"

This is in marked contrast to their European peers, who have a business model that relies on much higher match day revenue. As an extreme example, Real Madrid’s annual match day income of €129 million is almost exactly nine times as much as Napoli, while English clubs also earn considerably more, e.g. Manchester United €122 million and Arsenal €115 million. Now I’m not suggesting for a minute that it would be feasible for Napoli to attain such levels of revenue, but there is clearly some scope for improvement here, especially if they can adjust the customer mix to include more premium seating.

Some might argue that low pricing at matches is a good thing and has not harmed the financials of German clubs, which I would agree with up to a point, but it is worth noting that match day revenue still tends to be higher in Germany than Italy, e.g. Schalke 04 and Borussia Dortmund, who are analogous to Napoli in many ways (large, passionate crowds), earned €25 million and €23 million respectively last year, nearly twice as much as the Partenopei’s €14 million. Furthermore, Bayern Munich (€67 million) and Hamburg (€49 million) earn a great deal more.

Even though Napoli’s revenue growth has been striking, what is really driving their excellent profits is their ability to keep costs under control, especially the wage bill. Although wages increased 25% last season to €39 million, the important wages to turnover ratio is still only 42%, which is astonishingly low for a major football club and way below UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70%. As a comparison, the five Italian clubs with higher revenue than Napoli all have significantly worse ratios: Inter 104%, Milan 83%, Juventus 67%, Roma 82% and Fiorentina 67%.

This reflects the tough wage policy implemented by De Laurentiis, which many of his players have discovered to their chagrin. For example, when Lavezzi asked for a pay rise a couple of years ago, the owner gave him short shrift, “If an actor were to behave like this, I would eat him alive.”

Napoli’s wage bill of €39 million is the seventh highest in Italy, but it’s miles behind the “big boys”: Inter €234 million, Milan €172 million, Juventus €138 million and Roma €101 million. According to the annual salary survey published by La Gazzetta dello Sport, the net cost of Napoli’s first team squad is just €28 million and only four players earn more than €1 million a season: Cavani €1.8 million, Andrea Dossena €1.5 million, Lavezzi €1.4 million and Hamsik €1.3 million.

In fact, La Gazzetta also amusingly pointed out that the €11 million total cost of Napoli’s starting XI is less than the €12 million cost of Milan’s Zlatan Ibrahimovic on his own (salary €9 million, bonus €3 million).

Of course, a club’s total wage bill does not just comprise players’ salaries, though this was the largest element of Napoli’s costs at €29 million. In addition, there were €4.2 million for salaries of coaches and €1.6 million bonuses.

To strike a cautionary note, it is entirely possible that wages will increase further in the future, as the club attempts to retain its crown jewels. Indeed, the accounts specifically mention that these costs will rise as part of the company’s strategic investment, though they argue that any growth will be sustainable. It is also true that sporting director Bigon has been working to move on some squad players, which will be of benefit to the wage bill.

"Walter Gargano - Napoli's other Uruguayan"

Similar to salaries, the strengthening of the squad has resulted in a 45% increase in player amortisation from €28 million to €40 million, which is more or less the same level as Milan and Juventus, but below Inter (€65 million), so is on the high side for a club of Napoli’s stature.

For those not overly familiar with accounting methodology, amortisation is simply the annual cost of writing-down a player’s purchase price. Almost all clubs book this evenly over the life of a player's contract, but Napoli use an accelerated amortisation method, which I have not seen in any other club that I have reviewed. For example, in a five-year contract the amortisation rates are: 40%, 30%, 20%, 7% and 3%.

To illustrate how this works, when Fabio Quagliarella was signed for €18 million on a five-year contract, the entire transfer fee was not booked immediately, but was reflected in the profit and loss account via amortisation with €7.2 million booked in 2009 (40% of €18 million). Thus, the total cost of player purchases does not fully show up in the expenses straight away, but increased transfer spend will ultimately feed through to the accounts as a result of higher amortisation.

Therefore, the fact that amortisation increased by so much (from €4 million in 2007 to €40 million in 2010) would imply that Napoli have been spending big in the transfer market and, as we saw earlier, that is indeed the case. Having spent virtually nothing in the six years up to 2006/07, ever since the club returned to Serie A the taps have been turned on with net expenditure (purchases of sales proceeds) of €118 million. In fact, Futebol Finance placed Napoli in ninth place in their European league of highest spenders in the transfer market in 2009/10.

One of the reasons that former sporting director Pierpaolo Marino was let go was his patchy record in spending the small fortune given to him by De Laurentiis. Although he managed to locate some gems during his tenure, paying just €5.6 million for Lavezzi and €5.5 million for Hamsik, there’s little doubt that many of his purchases failed to live up to their potential with the likes of German Denis, Jesus Datolo and Matteo Contini being moved on at a loss. The owner further complained that “we still have many players here as a result of the errors of previous mercati. Why do we keep players here when we know we don’t have any use for them?”

Riccardo Bigon, the new sporting director, has made an excellent start by making possibly the deal of the season, when he secured the services of Cavani from Palermo’s volatile president Maurizio Zamparini for the ridiculously low price of a €4 million loan fee with an option to buy next summer for €12 million. After a relatively quiet January transfer window when Napoli “only” purchased Victor Ruiz from Espanyol for €6 million (plus Datolo) and Giuseppe Mascara from Catania, all eyes will be on the Partenopei’s dealings in the summer.

In spite of this lavish expenditure on new players, Napoli are in a very good debt position. In fact, they now have no bank debts at all, after eliminating the €32 million balance in 2005, and actually have cash balances of €14 million. They do owe €14 million to the parent company Filmauro (owned by De Laurentiis) and €4 million to shareholders, but this is not a major issue. This enviable position is a sign of the club’s self-sufficiency and is in marked contrast to Milan and Inter, who have large bank debts of €164 million and €71 million respectively, which represents two thirds of the Serie A total of €352 million.

However, one financing mechanism actively embraced by Napoli is stage payments on transfer fees, a device that is very widely used in Italy. This helps explain why Napoli can afford their sizeable transfer expenditure in recent years, as the net transfer fees payable to other clubs have risen to €36 million (payables €48 million less receivables €12 million). As an example of how this works, the transfer fee for Quagliarella was €18 million, but Napoli still owed Udinese €12.5 million as at 30 June 2010 with the following payment schedule: December 2010 €4.9 million, March 2011 €2.1 million, December 2011 €3.85 million and March 2012 €1.65 million.

Nevertheless, Napoli have one of the strongest balance sheets in Serie A with net assets of €25 million, only behind Fiorentina, Juventus, Udinese and Cagliari. What is even more impressive is that this position has very largely been reached without the owner having to cover shortfalls by providing cash injections, as is the case at many other clubs. Furthermore, the club’s profits have been used to reinforce reserves, rather than being distributed to the owners.

So what of the future?

Like every other ambitious club, Napoli will have to meet the challenge of keeping salaries at a low level, while seeking to make further progress in terms of sporting results. It seems likely that costs will continue to rise, especially salaries and player amortisation, as a consequence of strengthening the squad and extending player contracts, so this will be more difficult than in the past. That said, if Napoli do qualify for the Champions League, that could be worth an additional €40 million revenue, mainly from UEFA’s central distributions, but also via more gate receipts and better commercial deals.

In that eventuality, the question is how much of the extra funds Napoli will choose to spend. The money could be used to recruit better players, but this might place a risk on the club’s finances, as there is no guarantee that the European adventure will last more than a single season. This is similar to the dilemma facing Tottenham this season.

"Marek Hamsik rocking the hedgehog haircut"

The question that is probably uppermost in the minds of Napoli fans is whether the club can hang on to its stars. There has been almost constant speculation about Hamsik, Lavezzi and Cavani, who could certainly earn more money elsewhere. The last thing that De Laurentiis would want is for Napoli to acquire the reputation of being a selling club, but the club might be tempted to cash in on its assets, especially if the players themselves want to leave.

Cavani himself has been quoted recently as saying that the only club he would leave Napoli for is Real Madrid, but no less than an authority than Jose Mourinho commented, “Edinson Cavani, Marek Hamsik and Ezequiel Lavezzi are great players in an important club. The side wants to grow, not sell and for this reason I don’t go looking for their players.” However, things can change quickly in the football world, so it would not be a massive surprise to see one of them leave, especially as their value in the transfer market (€147 million per Transfermarkt) is considerably higher than on the balance sheet (€50 million).

On the other hand, De Laurentiis may be tempted to use the Champions League war chest to take the team to the next level, especially as the team seems to struggle when one of the tridente is missing. The president has already announced the purchase of two promising players: Slovenian striker Tim Matavz from Groningen and Argentine defender Federico Fernandez from Estudiantes. Many other potential purchases have been mentioned in dispatches, the most frequent names being Udinese’s Gokhan Inler and Villarreal’s Borja Valero.

"Christian Maggio - flying down the wing"

Any activity in the transfer market will be partly determined by the coach. Although there have been a few whispers that Mazzarri interests Juventus, De Laurentiis has nipped the rumours in the bud, “He still has three years left on his contract. You (journalists) will still be dealing with him for a while.”

However, it’s unlikely that Napoli will suddenly go crazy with their expenditure. De Laurentiis recently stated that the club would “not change its initial plan of gradual growth.” When he was coming under pressure to buy more players in the January transfer window, he argued, “The best signing was made by those clubs that spent the least, thereby keeping their books in order, in line with the financial fair play rules.”

The president of the Italian Football Federation, Giancarlo Abete, recently praised Napoli as an example for other clubs to follow for their ability to compete with the Northern giants while balancing their budget. He further observed that they were already in line with UEFA’s upcoming Financial Fair Play initiative: “Someone like Aurelio De Laurentiis, who has been able to carefully plan for the future, can calmly approach the new environment, keeping costs under control.”

"Paolo Cannavaro - leading by example"

This is one reason why the club is seeking to upgrade its academy, so that homegrown youth players can progress to the first team instead of the club continually having to “gamble” on bringing in new players at exorbitant prices. Indeed, De Laurentiis has spoken of a desire to emulate Barcelona (as indeed have many other owners), but clearly such a project takes time to come to fruition.

In the meantime, there is still all to play for this season. Although the president claimed that he could not compete with the Berlusconis of this world, the fact is that Napoli have done a pretty good job of proving him wrong with their thrilling challenge for the title. As a film producer, De Laurentiis will be very aware that a film does not always have a happy ending, but Napoli’s fans can certainly dream of an exciting future.